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Abstract 
Certain religious entrepreneurial minded communities are highly successful. It is tempting to assume 
that the underlying social mechanism of business success can be used as a blueprint for the development 
of larger social entities. Recently, Javaid, Shamsi and Hyder (2020) have argued that inefficiencies of 
markets and bureaucracies may be avoided if religious entrepreneurial communities are considered an 
alternative for members’ business investment, capital- and expertise-support to businesses, and the re-
distribution of wealth in favor of economically vulnerable community members. Consequently, the title 
of their paper is “Religious entrepreneurial communities as a solution for socioeconomic injustice”. I 
address this problematic position by an extended comment and point out inefficiencies induced by such 
an approach. I apply the concepts of networks and clubs to tackle problems of religious entrepreneurial 
communities as sub-groups of larger social entities. Individual beliefs, individual preferences, and 
norms of cooperative behavior can occur among members of any community, with or without common 
religious beliefs. Consequently, a shift from the areligious, market-oriented form of economic organi-
zation towards specific sets of religious beliefs will not, by itself, endanger business success. These 
issues require considerable attention before a transfer of behavioral pattern prevalent in small commu-
nities can be applied to larger groups. I emphasize the danger of generalizations from small case study 
results of specific entrepreneurial communities to larger social entities, such as societies. 
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A persistent finding from the research of religion and economic development 
is that some religious groups foster entrepreneurial behavior more than other 
groups. Since Max Weber introduced this line of thought, it has been investi-
gated in countless variations. It is indeed tempting to ask whether behavioral 
patterns of entrepreneurial successful religious groups can be used as a blue-
print for the development of larger social entities. This may be particularly 
tempting if other organizational arrangements in a society, such as the market 
or the state, show unfavorable results in respect to developmental progress. A 
recent study by Javaid, Shamsi and Hyder (2020), who follow such a line of 
thought for Pakistan, is the starting point of this discussion. 
From an investigation of the Memon, Delhiwala, and Chinioti com-
munities in Pakistan, Javaid, Shamsi and Hyder (2020) claim that some Mus-
lim entrepreneurial-oriented communities provide support for entrepreneurial 
activities of their members, (1) which serves well the individual interests of 
the members in terms of business profitability and household income growth, 
and thus can be seen as advancing the cause of social justice (in alleviating 
poverty by redistribution of wealth both within and outside their communi-
ties), and (2) which should be seen as a blueprint for a value system to be 
recommended to supplant the free market system, among other extant forms 
of economic organization. 








It is noteworthy, first, that patterns of successful religious communi-
ties are not limited to Pakistan (Papanek, 1972) or Islamic countries. The pat-
tern has been found around the world (e.g., Anderson et al., 2000; Egbert, 
2009; Egbert et al. 2011; Glazer and Moniyan, 1963) and for a considerably 
diverse group of religious communities (e.g., Dana, 2007; Cheung and Yeo-
chi king, 2004; Egbert, 1998; Greene, 1997), and it remains a core topic in 
entrepreneurship research (Brammer et al., 2007; Dana, 2009). Second, there 
is nothing surprising about rules-of-conduct in a community reciprocated by 
communal support through network and capital for the adherents of such rules 
that serve the profitability interests of its members. This is how clubs func-
tion, as a network of relationships among its members. It is not religiosity that 
fosters business success, it is rather the set of values in a specific pattern of 
preferences on the side of community members, regardless of the religious 
persuasion of the persons who adhere to such communal preferences. 
I, thus, find the first descriptive point made by Javaid et al. to be 
straightforward and noncontroversial. It is with their second, prescriptive 
claim that this paper is concerned, namely, that policymakers can consider 
the underlying religious sociocultural norms of successful communities as a 
role model, or as an example, in order to develop policy tools with the aim to 
reduce socioeconomic injustice in societies. They use the term socioeconomic 
justice as derived from an earlier discussion of Islamic and capitalist concep-
tions of justice (Javaid and Hassan, 2013), but here I do not deal with this 
issue, one way or another. 
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The focus is on their second claim. It is the suggestion that the value 
system and norms of religious entrepreneurial-motivated communities can 
supplement or even replace other institutions in a society that are commonly 
employed to achieve these tasks. 
“The religious entrepreneurial communities may be seen as an alter-
nate to free-market or state-driven methods to impart socioeconomic justice 
where needed. The voluntary inclination of entrepreneurs in such communi-
ties to facilitate those in need may, perhaps, reduce or even eliminate the need 
to involve state intervention to redistribute wealth through taxation, which 
may also eliminate the cost of the state bureaucracy, which is used for the 
collection and redistribution of taxes.” (Javaid et al., 2020, p. 415) 
Economic policies in countries of North America, Western Europe 
and Asia are not based on religious beliefs – though their citizens may hold 
religious beliefs – and yet these policies have achieved the reduction of pov-
erty (which could be a proxy for socioeconomic justice) at moderate to re-
markable rates. Javaid et al. make an indefensible claim when they assert that 
neither the state nor the free-market—in practice two rarely applied ex-
tremes—are often ineffective, but “[…] the free-market and liberal state are 
often seen as sources of social disintegration of local communities leading to 
an increase of socioeconomic injustice […].” Javaid et al. (2020, 416). 
This observation seems to be the reason why they follow a line of 
thought that resembles Granovetter’s embeddedness approach. This approach 
positions the organizational form of networks between markets with isolated 








individuals and hierarchies (Williamson, 1975). In this line of thought, net-
works are considered superior organizational forms compared to markets and 
hierarchies (Granovetter, 1985). Indeed, religious entrepreneurial communi-
ties may be treated as networks, as I show in the next section. Javaid et al. 
suggest that the socioeconomic value system of religious entrepreneurial 
communities is an alternative to market and bureaucracy, to capitalism and 
communism and that they can replace or supplement a stately organized re-
distribution system. They propose that researchers and policymakers may 
consider this alternative to advance socioeconomic justice (Javaid et al., 2020, 
416, 433).  
This position is provocative but addresses an essential point. Since we 
know that religion may promote or hamper entrepreneurial values (cf. also 
Dana, 2009), the question addressed is whether this knowledge can be used 
to the benefit of larger social entities. While I agree on the positive effects of 
the redistribution of wealth within the communities and society, our following 
discussion is critical to the suggested implementation of values and norms 
based on entrepreneurial religious communities on other sub-groups in a 
given society.  
I focus on two main issues: Firstly, I argue that such an approach is 
hardly feasible provided that such communities are addressed by the theory 
of clubs and the theory of networks. The reason is that institutions of networks 
and clubs discriminate against non-members. Discrimination is imminent in 
the structure of both institutions because they include and exclude individu-
als. As it has recently been emphasized, social capital may nonetheless lead 
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to inequality (Pena-López et al., 2021). Related to this aspect, I formulate 
relevant questions. These questions need consideration before one proceeds 
in the proposed direction. Secondly, religious entrepreneurial communities 
and their value systems can be considered a cause of existing injustice in so-
cieties. 
I address this argument by the logic of a simple thought experiment in 
which community members use the market to realize business profits, but re-
distribution is confined to the network. In the next section, I discuss the theory 
of networks and clubs applied to religious entrepreneurial communities. In 
the third section I argue, that religious entrepreneurial communities may be 
considered not as the solution but as a possible cause of social injustice and 
market failure. Finally, I conclude.  
 
Clubs and networks as structures of discrimination 
To address the problem, I construct a verbal model in the form of a 
thought experiment. I structure a hypothetical society as follows: Let us as-
sume a heterogeneous society S. A is a subgroup within S. Subgroup A is ho-
mogeneous with respect to its individual members. A may resemble an entre-
preneurial-minded community. Its respective members share similar individ-
ual characteristics. A has emerged in history. S may have discriminated 
against some of its members in the past who formed the distinct sub-group A. 
Or, some individuals have positioned themselves apart from S, e.g. by reject-
ing mainstream religious beliefs or norms, thus forming A. In both cases, the 








reason why A has become a distinct sub-group within S is historical. Muslim 
and Christian history is full of examples that sub-groups split from main-
stream religious beliefs and constituted separate, often exclusive, communi-
ties. Independent of exogenously ascribed or endogenously evolved differ-
ence, the identity of A derives from (real or imagined) distinctiveness from S. 
In order to elaborate on A I apply, firstly, the network analogy and, secondly, 
the theory of clubs. 
The relative strength of links between network members in A is due 
to personal ties. This is so because members share specific individual charac-
teristics—e.g., ethnicity, religious denomination, migration experiences, his-
tory, or else—and follow specific norms and value systems. The sub-structure 
within A may consist of clan and family or other social entities. If we assume 
that A is a network, then it discriminates non-members by definition. Mem-
bership in A is exclusive and bound to individual characteristics. These cannot 
be acquired by the deeds of a particular individual, but are inherited, e.g. eth-
nicity, religious denomination, family, class, caste, etc. Network membership 
constitutes a form of social capital. 
Network members have access to specific resources. These resources 
are unavailable or available at higher costs for outsiders. Cases at hand are 
access to information, credit, employment opportunities, suppliers or custom-
ers (cf. Dana, 2009, 92-93). Barriers effectively keep non-members outside. 
Thus a member of S cannot enter A. A reproduces itself as a closed network 
if characteristics can only be acquired by birth. 
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A specific interpretation of religion—distinct from the interpretation 
of S—allows A to set itself apart from S. The interpretation of religion func-
tions as an entry barrier. The promotion of specific value systems in the net-
work enhances its exclusiveness. Religion and religious teaching may foster 
value systems, which are important for entrepreneurship, as Dana (2009, 88) 
outlines. Consequently, some groups are entrepreneurially successful. Javaid 
et al. stress this point. However, they do not address the issue that it is the 
ability of networks to keep outsiders outside the network that can be one of 
the major reasons for entrepreneurial success. 
A network with social links resembles a club in economic theory. Gal-
braith et al. (2007) employ the economic theory of club goods with respect to 
social capital. Next, I apply the economic theory of clubs to the case at hand, 
i.e. religious entrepreneurial communities. A club is a sub-group of individu-
als who belong to a larger entity. Clubs emerge to realize specific goals. In 
most cases, it is the provision of a club good. If clubs provide club goods for 
their members, then it is important to exclude non-members from these goods. 
The original contribution is by Tiebout (1956). Here I follow the extension of 
this model introduced by Buchanan (1965). Buchanan states that individuals 
form clubs within a society. The aim of the club is to provide and share quasi-
public goods (club goods) among club members. Since all club members can 
use these club goods, rivalry in consumption appears among club members if 
too many members join the club. Exclusion of new members appears vitally 
important in case of congestion. The price of club membership is the price for 
the right to use the club goods. The optimal club size is certainly finite. 








A religious entrepreneurial community such as A resembles a club in 
society S. Club membership is exclusive (however, often involuntary), and 
the number of club members is the size of community A. The club provides 
club goods such as access to resources, specific value system, rule enforce-
ment within the club, social ties, to mention but some. Moreover, cooperative 
behavior within the network and charity giving within the community are also 
club goods. They are available only for members of A but not for non-mem-
bers (Galbraith, 2007). If I consider A firstly as a network and secondly as a 
club in the way described above, the ability to exclude outsiders and to pre-
serve exclusiveness is essential for its existence. Religion, ethnicity, class, 
caste may be criteria for inclusion and exclusion. 
The advantages that individuals gain through network and club mem-
bership are not without costs. These costs become apparent when individuals 
aspire to leave. They lose access to resources and, in closely-knit social com-
munities, they have to pay the social costs of exclusion. Christian and Muslim 
history provide examples of persecution of individuals who do not follow 
community norms and try to leave their communities. The stability of clubs 
and the stability of networks and, hence, of closely-knit religious entrepre-
neurial communities largely depends on the successful exclusion of outsiders 
and the prevention of members from leaving the community. If a community 
is relatively stable in the above sense, it can provide club goods at relatively 
low costs to its members. 
As an additional hint one may point out that the above argumentation 
does not require concepts such as social capital, embeddedness or trust (cf. 
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Egbert, 2006). In religious networks, social capital is ascribed by birth, not 
by deeds; embeddedness is a consequence of closeness and personalized re-
lations; trust is not required as a prerequisite for the community—if interac-
tions in the closed network are assumed to be infinite, then permanent coop-
eration is the only stable Nash-equilibrium for all community members. Thus, 
cooperation and reciprocity among members of A are rather a consequence of 
the organizational arrangement, not its origin, and thus not a consequence of 
religious teaching. 
Having said this, let us now address the suggestion of Javaid et al. To 
quote one of their central claims: “ […] religious entrepreneurial communities 
may offer a viable alternate to the default organizational structure (bureau-
cratic system) prevalent in both capitalist and communist societies […]” and 
“So one may ask, is an organizational designed built on the idea of religiously 
motivated personalization of relationship is better than the bureaucratic de-
sign of organization for the sake of advancing socioeconomic justice or even 
better from viewpoint of modern idea of freedom?” (Javaid et al. 2020, 432). 
In essence, their suggestion is to implement a more effective organi-
zational arrangement than markets and/or state/bureaucracy. I argue that re-
lying on religious entrepreneurial communities as a more effective organiza-
tional arrangement is highly problematic. To illustrate some of these prob-
lems, I assume that the norms of a successful entrepreneurial community A 
are planned to be implemented in S. I outline some consequential questions 
which show that such an approach is not feasible. 








First, why should members of S be willing to accept or follow the rules 
and norms of sub-group A, if historically A actively isolated itself from S, or 
A was discriminated by S? History may have cured some of the original rea-
sons for A being different from S, but it is rather unlikely to assume that S will 
welcome the rules and norms of A. Imagine one of both is Shia and the other 
is Sunnite, or one a Protestant denomination and the other Catholic, or one 
Muslim and the other Hindu. An implementation of rules, norms and value 
systems will hardly be accepted. Instead, members of S may show active re-
sistance to such an approach. Javaid et al. are silent on this apparent problem. 
The question is why should members of S accept to follow norms prevalent 
in A? 
Second, if I assume that there is not only one but more successful re-
ligious entrepreneurial communities in one society, such as A, B and C with 
different value sets (Dana, 2009, 96) in a given society S, then the following 
questions occur: Whose value set is appropriate for S and who selects whether 
to apply the value set of A, B, or C? Is it possible to implement a ranking on 
these sets and to make a statement whose norms are more effective to reduce 
poverty? How will the other communities react to such an imposition of ex-
ogenous rules? If A provides the pattern, there is no reason for B and C to give 
up their successful norms. Javaid et al. are silent on this important question 
as well. 
Third, S is heterogeneous with respect to values, preferences and per-
sonal ties among its members. How will the society treat those individuals 
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who cannot or do not prefer following the norms of a sub-group? If redistri-
bution depends on personalized links, then how to treat those individuals who 
have no personalized links or are unable or unwilling to establish personalized 
links? Are these individuals excluded from redistribution? Will they remain 
comparatively poorer because they do not have links to the network? If the 
receiving of charity or transfers depends on personalized links and not on in-
dividual needs, it will be challenging to justify such a redistribution with any 
concept of socioeconomic justice. The result could be a Pareto inferior situa-
tion compared to an ineffective state bureaucracy. 
Fourth, if values and norms are transferred from A to S, the network 
expands. Obviously, A loses its exclusive character as a club because the num-
ber of members increases. The consequences are manifold. The group be-
comes less homogeneous; thus, rule enforcement becomes more difficult and 
more expensive. If the group and each individual face higher costs due to 
larger network size, free-riding on club goods becomes more likely. Since 
entrepreneurial success is positively linked to exclusiveness and not neces-
sarily to group size, newly formed sub-groups and new clubs are likely to 
emerge in S (cf. also Galbraith, 2007). 
While markets fail in the provision of public goods and may cause 
poverty for some but not for others, a bureaucracy has the potential to coun-
terbalance inefficient market outcomes. There is no doubt that corruption in 
markets and corruption in bureaucracies limit the effectiveness of both insti-
tutional arrangements (Kruger, 1974; Niskanen, 1975) and may lead to pov-
erty or to socioeconomic injustice. However, it is highly unlikely that social 








arrangements, which are effective in religious communities, will also be ef-
fective if transferred to larger social entities. These arrangements are effective 
exactly because a network has a limited size. 
Finally, networks are not free from corruption. In this aspect, they are 
similar to real (and not hypothetic) markets and bureaucracies. The advantage 
of markets and bureaucracy is that, at least theoretically, participation is pos-
sible for many, and distribution is neutral with respect to individual charac-
teristics. In contrast, a network excludes by its very nature individuals and 
distinguishes between insiders and outsiders. Consequently, neutral bureau-
cracies are more effective to provide specific public goods, such as law en-
forcement, redistribution, schooling, etc., than networks. 
In the next section, I go one step further. I argue that religious com-
munities that are entrepreneurially successful can also be a cause for a given 
unequal distribution of wealth in a society and for existing injustice. I do not 
argue here that this is an outcome that these groups or individuals have in-
tended, but it could be a consequence of existing networks in a given society. 
 
Religious entrepreneurial communities as a cause for social injustice 
For the following, I refer again to community A constituting a sub-
group of society S. I explicitly do not refer to any specific religious commu-
nity or society. Entrepreneurial success can be depicted by a multitude of var-
iables. For simplicity and to frame our argument, I refer to only one variable. 
I use profit before tax, defined as revenues minus costs. The higher the profit, 
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the more successful the enterprise or the entrepreneur is. Let us further as-
sume that entrepreneur A1 is successful in this sense, i.e. realizing a compar-
atively high profit through her business activities. To illustrate our case, let 
us further assume that A1 produces bread. She sells it to fellow community 
members but mostly to members of S. Her profit stems from selling at prices 
above marginal costs. I assume that the bread is tasty, demand and sales are 
high. Given 𝑆 − 𝐴 >  𝐴, she realizes profits mainly by selling to members of 
S. In short, the bread market allows her to realize profits and to be a successful 
entrepreneur. Her position on the market is uncontested because if potential 
competitors from S want to enter the bread market, she can activate network 
resources. She uses the network to maintain market power and can continu-
ously sell at prices above marginal costs. 
Following her religious and/or community norms, she redistributes 
large parts of her profits to fellow members of A. This may be charity giving 
or stimulating fellow members of A to start their own business. She may also 
grant charity to individuals in S with whom she keeps ties. Consequently, the 
profit she realizes by selling to members of S is reallocated to and distributed 
largely in A because personalized relations are crucial for redistribution, and 
she has more ties to members in A than to members in S. Enabling other mem-
bers of A to become also successful entrepreneurs means strengthening the 
reallocation process from S to A. Consequently, the wealth/poverty gap be-
tween members of A and S increases. In this simple model, successful entre-
preneurial behavior makes the community A better off, while the majority 
population in S is not improving. 








On a more abstract level, the following occurs: The institution of the 
market allows the selling of goods and the accumulation of profit. The insti-
tution of a network is used by individuals to realize the gains that the institu-
tion of the market offers. The gains are mainly redistributed within the net-
work. If justice is considered, the institution of the state (in the form of bu-
reaucracy) may be required to balance a rising inequality gap. A bureaucracy 
that implements a social policy, e.g., a tax system, functions to cure the neg-
ative externalities caused by markets and is enforced by networks. A bureau-
cracy is useful because it allows the implementation of non-discriminatory 
policy towards citizens, while redistributions via a network based on person-
alized relationships are discriminatory. 
Two aspects from the above argumentation are worth noting. Firstly, 
it makes little sense to consider the market, network, or state/bureaucracy as 
alternative institutions. Instead, the network or its individual members utilize 
the market—and often also the state/bureaucracy—to realize profits. The 
market is a prerequisite to make entrepreneurs successful but also to increase 
social welfare. Networks can be understood as a means of channeling profits 
and welfare to specific groups in a society. 
In such a constellation, the state, hence, the bureaucracy, is required 
to cure the negative externalities caused by markets and networks. From this 
perspective networks, as those of religious entrepreneurial communities, can 
undermine the effectiveness of markets and states. Networks are not a solu-
tion to reduce poverty and to improve wealth distribution but can be a root 
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cause of socioeconomic injustice. This argument is rendered to be even 
stronger if the market power of networks is considered. 
Secondly, individuals maximize utility within a given institutional 
framework. If I define utility maximization in non-monetary terms, e.g. the 
maximization of social status or social reputation, it is well in line with value 
systems prevalent in some entrepreneurial communities. If the status in a 
group is gained through charity giving or being generous to society, those 
individuals who give most, receive the highest status. The more profit indi-
viduals make on markets, the more they can redistribute, and the higher their 
status in their community is. Thus, utility maximization can go hand in hand 
with the non-monetary values of religious communities. Profit maximization 
on markets, as a proxy of entrepreneurial success, is then a way to maximize 
social status or social esteem, as Weber already pointed out in the past. Nev-
ertheless, individual utility maximization leads to distributional problems in 
the society and these are not solved through networks. 
To achieve the aim of more socioeconomic justice, i.e. less poverty, 
in a given society, one may think about an alternative approach. Would it not 
be more effective for a society’s welfare, i.e. a Pareto improvement, if the 
members of a religious entrepreneurial community in the initial step, when 
they use the market to generate success, are less successful? This would imply 
that they do not maximize their profits but instead charge lower prices and 
consequently allow all members of S to buy, as the above example goes, bread 
(and all other commodities) at lower prices. Thus, the welfare of the many 
and not of the few could be increased.  









The position of Javaid et al. (2020) to use religious entrepreneurial 
communities as alternatives to distributional systems of markets and 
states/bureaucracies is highly problematic since it would directly discriminate 
social groups that do not belong to these networks or are at the peripheries of 
such networks. For instance, these could be women, members of specific re-
ligious denominations, or ethnic minorities. There is no doubt that in the real-
world, markets and bureaucracies do not always provide efficient solutions 
with respect to socioeconomic justice. Particulaly if corruption is prevalent, 
these institutions do provide inefficient and undesirable solutions. Neverthe-
less, religious entrepreneurial can only represent sub-sections of a society and 
thus discriminate a priori large parts of a society. Markets and bureaucracies 
have at least the potential to be neutral to individual criteria of societies’ mem-
bers. Consequently, a shift from the areligious, market-oriented form of an 
economic organization towards specific sets of religious beliefs will not re-
duce the cause of social justice. 
 
References 
1. Anderson, A. R., Drakopoulou Dodd, S., & Scott, M. G. (2000). Religion as an environmental 
influence on enterprise culture: The case of Britain in the 1980s. International Journal of Entre-
preneurial Behaviour & Research, 6(1), 5–20.  
2. Brammer, S., Williams, G., & Zinkin, J. (2007). Religion and attitudes to corporate social respon-
sibility in a large cross-country sample. Journal of Business Ethics, 71(3), 229–243.  
3. Buchanan, J. M. (1965). An economic theory of clubs. Economica, 32(125), 1–14.  
Egbert, H. 2021. Religious Entrepreneurial Communities: Solution for or Cause of Socioeconomic In-







4. Cheung, T. S., & Yeo-chi king, A. (2004). Righteousness and profitableness: The moral choices 
of contemporary Confucian entrepreneurs. Journal of Business Ethics, 54, 245–260.  
5. Dana, L. P. (2007). A humility–based enterprising community: The Amish people in Lancaster 
County. Journal of Enterprising Communities: People and Places in the Global Economy, 1(2), 
142–154.  
6. Dana, L. P. (2009). Religion as an explanatory variable for entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship 
and Innovation, 10(2), 87–99.  
7. Egbert, H. (1998). Entrepreneurial advantages and disadvantages of belonging. GeoJournal, 
46(2), 129–134.  
8. Egbert, H. (2006). Cross-border Small-scale trading in South-Eastern Europe: Do embeddedness 
and social capital explain enough? International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 30(2), 
346–361.  
9. Egbert, H. (2009). Business success through social networks? A comment on social networks and 
business success. American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 68(3), 665–677.  
10. Egbert, H., Fischer, G., & Bredl, S. (2011). Different background—similar strategies. Journal of 
Entrepreneurship 20(2), 189-205.  
11. Galbraith, C. S., Rodriguez, C. L., & Stiles, C. H. (2007). Social capital as a club good: The case 
of ethnic communities and entrepreneurship. Journal of Enterprising Communities: People and 
Places in the Global Economy, 1(1), 38–53.  
12. Glazer, N., & Moynihan, D. P. (1963). Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, 
Italians and Irish of New York City. MIT, Boston, MA. 
13. Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic action and social structure: The problem of embeddedness. 
American Journal of Sociology, 91(3), 481–510.  
14. Greene, P. (1997). A resource-based approach to ethnic business sponsorship: a consideration of 
Ismaili-Pakistani immigrants. Journal of Small Business Management, 35(4), 58-72. 
15. Javaid, O., & Hassan, M. ul. (2013). A comparison of Islamic and capitalist conception of eco-
nomic justice. International Journal of Economics, Management and Accounting, 21(1), 1–31.  
16. Javaid, O., Shamsi, A. F., & Hyder, I. (2020). Religious entrepreneurial communities as a solution 
for socioeconomic injustice. Journal of Enterprising Communities: People and Places in the 
Global Economy, 14(3), 415–446.  
17. Kruger, A. O. (1974). The political economy of the rent-seeking society. American Economic 
Review, 64(3), 291–303.  








18. Niskanen, W. A. (1975). Bureaucrats and politicians. Journal of Law and Economics, 18(3), 617–
643.  
19. Papanek, H. (1972). Pakistan’s big businessmen: Muslim separatism, entrepreneurship, and par-
tial modernization. Economic Development & Cultural Change, 21(1), 1–32.  
20. Pena-López, A., Rungo, P., & Sánchez-Santos, J. (2021). Inequality and individual`s social net-
works. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 45(4), 675–693.  
21. Tiebout, C. M. (1956). A pure theory of local expenditures. Journal of Political Economy, 64(5), 
416–424.  
22. Williamson, O. (1975). Markets and Hierarchies. New York: The Free Press. 
 
Henrik Egbert is currently Professor of Economics at the Department of Economics, Anhalt University 
of Applied Sciences. He does research in Institutional Economics, Entrepreneurship and Networks, and 
Economic Anthropology and publishes on these topics. 
